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THE NECESSITY OF MOTION BEFORE TRIAL TO SUPPRESS
EVIDENCE OBTAINED BY ILLEGAL SEARCH
AND SEIZURE
The two cases, Bock v. City of Cincinnati and Tapp v. Same,' recently consid-
ered together by the Court of Appeals of Ohio, Hamilton County, stir interest
in the question of the admissibility of evidence obtained by illegal search and
seizure.
Two views upon the question are now somewhat crystallized; each has com-
manded analysis and criticism by eminent jurists on the bench and off.2 A large
majority of the courts in this country have held that evidence otherwise com-
petent is admissible notwithstanding the unlawful method by which it has been
obtained.3 On the other hand, a respectable minority, headed by the United
States Supreme Court, have taken the view that full effect can be given to the
constitutional guaranties against unreasonable search and seizure and self in-
crimination only by making such evidence inadmissible against the accused
party.4 The Illinois Supreme Court has aligned itself with the latter group.S
However, those courts which follow the minority rule have split on the ques-
tion as to whether, as a matter of procedure, a defendant must make a motion
prior to the trial for the return of, or to suppress, the evidence obtained by the
illegal search and seizure. Two views are evident in the decisions.
One line of authority adheres to the rule that this is simply a question of com-
petency of the evidence and, as in cases of other such evidential questions, it is
proper to make an objection to evidence at the time it is sought to be introduced
at the trial.6 Some of the courts taking this view regard it as the only proper
13[83 N.E. 119 (1932).
24 Wigmore, Evidence (2nd ed. 1923), 626, §§2183-4; Fraenkel, Concerning Searches and
Seizures, 34 Harv. L. Rev. 361, 386 (1921); Chafee, The Progress of the Law, 35 Harv. L. Rev.
673, 694 (1922); Atkinson, Unreasonable Searches and Seizures, 25 Col. L. Rev. 11 (1925);
Harno, Evidence Obtained By Unlawful Searches and Seizures, i 9 Ill L. Rev. 303 (1925);
Knox, Self Incrimination, 74 Univ. Pa. L. Rev. 139 (1925).
3 People v. Adams, 176 N.Y. 351, 68 N.E. 636 (i9o3), aff. in 192 U.S. 585, 24 Sup. Ct.
372 (I9O4); People v. Defore, 242 N.Y. 13, 15o N.E. 585 (1926) and cases cited therein.
4 Amendments IV and V, U.S. Constitution; and see corresponding sections in state con-
stitutions; Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 6 Sup. Ct. 524 (I886); Weeks v. United States,
232 U.S. 383, 34 Sup. Ct. 341 (1914); Gouled v. United States 255 U.S. 298, 41 Sup. Ct. 261
(1921); Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 46 Sup. Ct. 4 (1925); Grau v. United States,
278 U.S. 124, 53 Sup. Ct. 38 (x932). No attempt is made to cite the authorities in full.
5 People v. Brocamp, 307 Ill. 448, 138 N.E. 728 (1923); People v. Castree, 3i Ill. 392,
143 N.E. 112 (1924).
6 United States v. Wong QuongWong, 94Fed. 832 (1899); State v. Sheridan, 121 Iowa 164,
94 N.W. 730 (19o3); Youman v. Commonwealth, I89 Ky. 152, 224 S.W. 86o (1920); Blum v.
State, 94 Md. 375, 51 Atl. 26 (1902); Holmes v. State, 146 Miss. 351, ii So. 86o (i927); Walker
v. State, 239 Pac. 191 (Okla. Crim. App. 1925); State v. Slamon, 73 Vt. 212,5 o Ad. 1097 (1901);
State v. Wills, 91 W.Va. 659, 114 S.E. 261, 24 A. L. R. 1398 (1922); and see Holmes v. United
States, 275 Fed. 49 (1921); Chafee, The Progress of the Law, 35 Harv. L. Rev. 673 (1922).
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method which may be used to raise the issue,7 whereas most of them hold that it
is proper to make an objection at the time of the trial, or to make a motion before
the trial for the return of, or to suppress, the evidence wrongfully obtained. The
general attitude is, that while this may be a collateral issue, and some delay
may be caused in settling it, yet it is no more a collateral issue and would cause
no greater delay than would the raising and settling of an objection to evidence
for any other reason. 8 There would seem to be much merit in this rule. As for
the accused man, it insures him against losing his immunity from being faced
with this type of evidence, in those cases where he was unaware that it was going
to be used until the trial, and so had no earlier chance to protest its use. As for
the prosecution, it may be contended that it should be prepared to defend
against any attack upon its evidence, and so it is not an injustice to allow the
objection to be made at the trial; and, as for the court, it would save the trial
judge the useless formality of conducting a prior inquiry to determine the com-
petency of testimony that may never be offered at the trial.9
Another group of courts uphold the practice that, in order to take advantage
of the constitutional guaranties, the defendant must make a timely motion, at
least before the trial has begun, for the return of, or to suppress the use of, the
illegally obtained evidence.Io If he does this, then the court should decide the
matter at that time, but if it does not then decide the question, it may be raised
upon objection, when the evidence is offered at the trial. This rule is commonly
regarded as the orthodox corollary of the original minority rule of the United
States Supreme Court. The practice was first attempted in 19o8 in a federal dis-
trict court" as a means to circumvent the position of the United States Supreme
Court in affirming Adams v. People.12 Such a motion before trial was successful
7 Holmes v. State, 146 Miss. 35i, iii So. 86o (1927).
8 See Youman v. Commonwealth, 189 Ky. 152, 169, 224 S.W. 86o, 867 (1920).
9 See Holmes v. State, 146 Miss. 35I, 358, ii So. 86o, 86i (1927).
o Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 34 Sup. Ct. 34x (1914); Silverthorne Lumber Co
v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 40 Sup. Ct. 182 (192o); Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United
States, 282 U.S. 344, 51 Sup. Ct. 153 (1931); Farmer v. United States, 223 Fed. 9o3 (1915); Rice
v. United States, 251 Fed. 778 (1918); Macknight v. United States, 263 Fed. 832 (1920);
Youngblood v. United States, 266 Fed. 795 (1920); United States v. Rykowski, 267 Fed. 866
(1920); Wiggins v. United States, 272 Fed. 41 (192r); United States v. O'Dowd, 273 Fed.
6oo (1921); Brink v. United States, 6o F. (2d) 231 (932); United States v. Notto, 61 F. (2d)
781 (1932); People v. Marxhausen, 204 Mich. 559, 171 N.W. 557 ('99); People v. Miller, 217
Mich. 635, 187 N.W. 366 (1922); Commonwealth v. Valsalka, 37 Ad. 405 (Pa. 1897); State
v. Hennessy, Ix4 Wash. 351, 195 Pac. 211 (1921); State v. Dersiy, 12I Wash. 700, 209 Pac.
837 (1922); State v. Funk, 17 P. (2d) ii (Wash. 1932); but see People v. Bass, 235 Mich.
588, 2og N.W. 927 (1926).
"United States v. Wilson, 163 Fed. 338 (I9O8).
1 76 N.Y. 351, 68 N.E. 636 (19O3), aff. in 192 U.S. 585, 24 Sup. Ct. 372 (x904). In the
Adams case the court had permitted evidence obtained by illegal search and seizure to be used
on the trial over the objections of the defendant, giving as one reason that to allow the ob-
jection would raise a collateral issue. The new practice escaped that difficulty by trying the
matter before the trial on the merits.
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in a later case; 3 and in 1914, the practice was made authoritative by the decision
in Weeks v. United States.'4
To this rule of practice the courts, under the leadership of the United States
Supreme Court, have since made certain qualifications.3 The nature of these
qualifications as well as the extent to which they have gone leads to an inquiry
as to the true justification for the requirement of a motion before trial. The
reason for the requirement is not disclosed in the cases dealing with this prob-
lem. The true reason would seem to be this: if no objection is voiced until the
offer of the evidence at the trial, the prosecution is not usually aware that the
method of obtaining the evidence is going to be called into question, and hence
is rarely prepared to defend it. This is especially true when we consider the way
the district attorney's business is conducted, the trials very often being handled
by officers quite remote from those who executed the arrest and the seizure of
the evidence, and who are often entirely unfamiliar with the detailed manner by
which the evidence was obtained. It might be contended, however, that this is
the fault of the prosecutor's office and it should not concern the court; if the
prosecutor chooses to come into court not fully prepared to meet such contin-
gencies, that is his misfortune and not the defendant's. The courts, however,
do not look at it in this way, but having an eye on the practical problems of
law enforcement, they are somewhat more favorable to the state than exact
justice would require, and will not permit the prosecution to be thus surprised.
On the other hand, were the prosecution to be allowed time to prepare its de-
fense of the evidence, it would entail prolonged interruption of the trial. This
interruption might be of considerable length, for in these cases very often there
is a question of whether or not there was probable cause for an 'arrest, upon
which depends the legality of the search and seizure.
That the above suggestions are the real reasons for the rule is verified some-
what by an observation of the nature of the rule and the two recognized excep-
tions. The rule allows objections to be taken at the trial if a prior motion before
trial has been made. The prosecution has then received a warning that certain
evidence will probably be protested and has had an opportunity to prepare
for such an objection. The court can require a quick hearing of the arguments
without injustice to the State and without a long delay of the trial.
Again, we see this policy silently operating in the cases which are held to be
within the qualifications of the rule. These are chiefly two. The first qualification
is illustrated by Gouled v. United States'6 in which the defendant, arrested and
3 United States v. Mills, 185 Fed. 318 (i9ii).
'4 232 U.S. 383, 34 Sup. Ct. 341 (19x4).
"See Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298, 41 Sup. Ct. 26i (192i); Amos v. United States,
255 U.S. Y3, 41 Sup. Ct. 266 (1921); Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 46 Sup. Ct. 47
(1925); State v. Warfield, 184 Wis. 56, i98 N.W. 854 (1924); and see People v. Bass, 235
Mich. 588, 209 N.W. 927 (1926) and strong dissent therein.
'6 Supra, note 15.
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jailed, is unaware until the trial that evidence has been taken from his premises
and is to be used against him. In this situation neither side has had a chance to
be prepared; but the defendant has as the basis for his objection, a constitutional
right, whereas against him is only a rule of convenience. Balancing these fac-
tors, the courts decide that in such cases the delay in the trial is warranted.
The second qualification is recognized in those cases where the unlawful
seizure of the evidence is not disputed, but is admitted or patent at the time of
the offer in evidence at the trial. 7 Obviously in such cases it would do the state
no good to have time to prepare itself upon this point; it is not unfair, therefore,
to have a ruling upon the matter at the trial; and it is not inexpedient, for the
court can decide the question speedily.
These qualifications seem, then, to confirm the idea that the real reason for
the rule, and one with some merit, lies in the combined policy of not allowing the
prosecution to be unduly prejudiced by a surprise attack, or in the alternative, of
not allowing overlong delays in the trials of cases.!8
In the instant cases, the Ohio Court of Appeals apparently would create an-
other qualification to the rule. Officers had taken certain evidence from the
persons and premises of the defendants, without search warrants or probable
cause to believe the defendants were violating the law. The appellate court held
that the searches and arrests were unlawful and the evidence so obtained should
have been excluded upon the defendants' objections at the trials. It was urged
on the court that no motion to suppress was made before the trial in either case.
The authority in favor of such requirement was conceded, and the qualification
in the Gouled case 9 was referred to. Then the court lays down what, it is sub-
mitted, might ground a third qualification to the already rifled motion-before-
trial rule.2a
What the Ohio Court is suggesting is this: in the haste and confusion of
police court examination, the defendant, through lack of advice and ignorance
of his legal rights, or through mere inadvertency, may fail to request a return
or suppression of ill-gotten evidence; this being true, it would be unfair to de-
'7Thus in Amos v. United States, 255 U.S. 313, 41 Sup. Ct. 266 (1921), the government
witness testified on cross-examination that there had been no warrant for the arrest or search.
18 The influence of these rather recent decisions creating qualifications will, no doubt, be
very important in the future considerations of the problem. Justice Cardozo, speaking as
a member of the New York Court of Appeals, in People v. Defore, 242 N.Y. 413, 15o N.E.
505 (1Q26), states that "the procedural condition of a preliminary motion has been sub-
stantially abandoned, or if enforced at all, is an exceptional requirement."
' Supra, note i5.
1.x83 N.E. 119, 122 (1932). The Court says: "We think, however, in the interest of an
orderly administration of justice that a motion to suppress should be made before trial upon
the merits, and the matter should not be raised as a collateral issue upon the trial. It is a
matter of common knowledge, however, that the daily dockets of police courts are heavy,
and that matters are presented therein rapidly and without the deliberation incident to
trials in the upper court. For this reason, the consideration of such collateral matter with
the case upon its merits, while not approved, may be excused."
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prive him of his constitutional immunity from the use of this evidence against
him; the balance of policy lies on his side rather than in favor of the rule of
practice.
The language of the court is not very strong; moreover, the circumstances
presented a strong case for the application of the rule which requires a motion
before trial. Far from being undisputed or admitted, the illegality of the search
and seizure in the case is debatable, depending on whether the court feels that
probable cause existed for the arrest and search. To decide this fairly would re-
quire delay in the trial to permit each side to marshal its facts and arguments.
If the motion before trial rule is to be retained at all, these Ohio cases would seem
to call for its application.
It is to be noted, that even if the result of these cases were accepted as proper
practice, it would not affect the great bulk of cases in which the problem of il-
legal searches and seizures arises; the instant cases arose in police court, whereas
the chief source of questions of this nature is felony cases which are tried in the
felony and circuit courts. The confusion and haste of the police court does not
exist there and a defendant can find no such excuse, as the Ohio court found for
him, to excuse his failure to file a timely motion to suppress such evidence.
Finally, we might regard the cases as other illustrations of a general distaste
for the motion-before-trial rule. This general attitude might be, in some degree,
a result of the fact that the question has lately arisen most often in prohibition
law violation cases; perhaps the courts were less disposed in such cases to insist
on the prosecution being safe from surprise attacks.
In any event, if the true tendency of the decisions be to delimit the rule into
ineffectiveness by a growing number of exceptions, it might be better to adopt a
simple, uniform rule which allows the objection to be made on the trial in all
cases.
JOHN N. FEGAN
THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE ILLINOIS INCOME
TAX LAW OF 1932
The recent case of Bachrach v. Nelson, has made it impossible under the pres-
ent provisions of the Constitution of Illinois to enjoy the advantages of the typi-
cal graduated income tax as a source of state revenue. The Illinois Constitution
states that the General Assembly shall tax property in proportion to its value,
authorizes a tax on certain designated businesses or occupations and on persons
or corporations owning or using franchises or privileges, and provides that other
objects or subjects can be taxed in such manner as may be consistent with prin-
ciples of taxation fixed in the Constitution.2 The Illinois legislature enacted a
law imposing a graduated tax upon residents of the state on entire net income,
upon nonresidents with respect to net income from sources within the state,
1 182 N. E. o9 (Ill. 1932 ) . 2Const., art. 9, §§ 1, 2.
